LA ANTIESTRATEGIA TRUMP CAUSA CAOS EN IRÁN
Por Robert Fox
Nota original: https://reaction.life/trumps-anti-strategy-is-causing-chaos-in-iran/
Se suponía que los ataques con misiles a dos bases norteamericanas en el norte de Iraq trazarían una línea de la crisis iniciada por el asesinato del General Qassem Soleimani de las FFAA iraníes y el offsider iraquí Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
Lejos de eso: ambos bandos, Washington y Teherán están esperando el próximo paso en un extraño juego de ajedrez en el cual parece que olvidaron las convenciones y las reglas del juego.
Un factor no menor es que Trump es impredecible - parece que asusta tanto a los gobiernos iraníes e iraquíes como a un gran número de oficiales en y cerca de Washington DC.
Las dos principales víctimas del ataque con un dron de EEUU en el aeropuerto de Bagad la semana pasada eran jugadores importantes y será difícil reemplazarlos. Ambos eran personas controvertidas como comandantes, subversivos e innovadores en la lucha de guerrillas. Las masas que se mostraron en los funerales de Qassem Soleimani enmascararon la controversia que su carrera y posición representaba entre enemigos, aliados y aún dentro del mismo régimen que servía.
Ambos eran innovadores - y ambos, de haber sobrevivido, hubieran sido arquitectos de sus países y su comunidad en un contraataque en la nueva fase de confrontación con los EEUU.
Eran socios en la incepción del Hezbolá libanés - el modelo de muchas milicias shiítas a través del Líbano, Siria e Iraq, que comandaron por más de 20 años. Hezbolá, dirigido por el Imad Mugnivé y sponsoreado por Irán, fue pionero en los autobombas suicidas y las bombas en camiones. En octubre de 1983 esos métodos fueron usados para volar la base de los Marines de EEUU en Beirut, asesinando a 241 miembros de las FFAA de EEUU y 59 paracaidistas militares franceses que estaban en esa base.
Dos meses después, al principio del mes de dicimbre de 1983,, una celda clandestina shiíta del movimiento en Dawa puso bombas en las embajadas de Francia y de EEUU, en el aeropuerto, y en lugares comerciales de Kuwait. El esquema fue diagramado por Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, quien fuera asesinado la semana pasada juntoa a Qassem Soleimani. Muhandis huyó a Irán donde se casó. En ausencia Kuwait lo sentenció a muerte.
En su exilio en Irán continuó complotando contra el régimen sunita de Saddam Hussein en Iraq, y contra sus aliados. Después de que Qassem Soleimani tomara a cargo los comandos Quds de los Cuerpos de la Guardia Revolucionaria de Irán en 1998, se convirtieron en aliados.
Fuentes israelíes y de EEUU le imputan que Soleimani estuvo presente en una reunión crítica con el fundador de Hezbolá, Imad Mugniyeh, a principios del 2008, cuando el último fuera asesinado por una operación conjunta de la CIA y el Mossad israelí. Los detalles son extremadamente confusos - parte porque la información provista tanto por EEUU como por Israel da dos fechas diferentes para el asesinato: el 30 de enero y el 12 de febrero. Pero los israelíes aducen que su operación fue dirigida en forma remota, a través de comunicaciones, por el jefe de las fuerzas armadas, el General Ashkenazy, y por el primer ministro Ehud Omert, quienes querían golpear no sólo a Mugniveh sino a Soleimani también. A último momento el presidente George Bush dijo que no, y el comando esperó a que el iraní se alejara del lugar en auto, antes de detonar la bomba.
Los norteamericanos lideraron una incursión en Iraq en el año 2003 que le dio a la fuerza Quds la gran oportunidad de establecer en el poder facciones de la Shía y militias luego de que se expulsara a Saddam Hussein del gobierno. Cambiaron las tácticas de las guerrillas, especialmente con la introducción de morteros de confección casera y las trampas de bombas en las rutas, baratas a la vez de mortales, conocidos, según lenguaje de la OTAN como Improvised Explosive Device (IED), Dispositivo Explosivo Improvisado. Es un sistema que fue exportado a todo Medio Oriente y adaptado con gran inventiva por los talibanes afganos. Los soldados británicos cayeron en grandes números gracias a los IEDs en Afganistán y en Basra, que terminó siendo una fuerza Quds informal de la satrapía.
Junto a los norteamericanos y a los británicos, los israelíes han sido los principales objetivos de los Quds y de Hezbolá. La guerra con múltiples bandos en Siria le dio a Soleimani una oportunidad fresca, donde sus fuerzas le entregaron misiles deon gran precisión, así como cohentes, a las milicias sirias y al Hezbolá libanés. Ahora la mayoría de los objetivos estratégicos, como el aeropuerto de Tel Aviv y las plantas de energía eléctrica sobre la costa están a tiro de los cohetes de Hezbolá.
Esto ha acelerado la discordia en Irán entre los principales líderes políticos y los altos mandos militares. Desde el año 2011, y con las disrupciones de la Primavera Árabe, Soleimani empezó a reconvertirse desde el mago de la guerrilla en la clandestinidad a un hombre de estado y estratega militar, no sin cierto toque de megalomanía, según sus críticos.
Uno de sus críticos era el presidente de Irán, Hassan Rouhani. El comandante y el presidente comenzaron a tener desacuerdos en público. Rouhani pensaba que el rock star de la guerrilla pedía demasiado dinero para su fuerza, que sólo es una parte de los Cuerpos de la Guardia de la Revolución Islámica. Soleimani públicamente se oponía al acuerdo nuclear que Irán había firmado con diversas naciones, el JCPOA del 2015, que Rouhani promovió. A regañadientes el líder supremo Ayatola Khamenei se inclinó por el político y no por el soldado.
Rouhani fue crítico de lo que él consideraba como los defectos del general, en especial en el apoyo a Houthi de Yemen, y en el generoso apoyo de tropas iraníes a los aliados en Siria. En una ocasión Soleimani envió 4000 militias con apoyo iraní para que pelearan en Idlib. Lo hizo sin pedir permiso a sus superiores en las FFAA iraníes. Más pública fue su discusión sobre el envío de misiles y cohetes iraníes a las bases en Siria. Desde una de las bases, T4 en Tiyas, se inició un ataque con un dron que impactó en el norte de Israel. Los israelíes respondieron bombardeando dos veces t4 en la primeravera del 2018 y golpeando otras baes utilizadas por las fuerzas sponsoreadas por los iraníes. Rouhani sugirió que las vidas de iraníes habían sido puestas en riesgo innecesariamente.
Una complicación adicional, que también afectó el comando de las Fuerzas de Movilización Popular - militias shiítas - bajo el mando de Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, es el costo creciente de los grupos de Hezbolá. Bajo la guía de Soleimani, el Hezbolá libanés se convirtió en una fuerza armada en condiciones de guerrear en toda regla, algo mucho más serio que una milicia, en la guerra de Siria. El costo ha sido grande en cantidad de muertos - de una fuerza de 10.000 a 15.000 miembros murieron al menos 2.500 combatientes y muchos más fueron heridos, muchos de ellos lisiados de por vida. Parte del acuerdo para llevar combatientes de Hezbolá a Siria era que Irán se hacía cargo de los salarios de los altos mandos, pagaban todo el reaprovisionamiento de armas y municiones, y pagaban las pensiones y compensaciones a las viudas de la guerra. Hay un acuerdo financiero similar para las milicias que actúan en Iraq.
Esto generó una nueva crisis tanto para Irán como para Iraq, especialmente para el gobierno de Adel Abdul al -Mahdi, un antiguo protegé de Teherán, actualmente fuertemente criticado. Irán, constreñido por las sanciones de EEUU, actualmente carece de las disponibilidades de efectivo para financiar estas aventuras. El dinero para las milicias tiene que ser lavado a través de canales corruptos y caminos clandestinos del régimen iraquí.
A Irán lo han secesionado del mercado del dólar. Vende cerca de 225.000 barriles de crudo por día en un contrato de largo plazo con China. Excepto por esto, el comercio es escaso. Gran parte del petróleo es contrabandeado a Iraq donde puede ser comercializado con facilidad porque no tiene rasgos específicos de los crudos de mejor calidad de conocidos campos petroleros.
Tanto Muhandis como Soleimani tienen enemigos internos tanto como externos. Esto ha generado una gran cantidad de teorías conspirativas en toda la región - por ejemplo, que pudieron haber sido traicionados por su propia gente. De acuerdo a uno de los informes, cuando el avión que transportaba a ambos generales llegó al aeropuerto de Bagdad, puero recibidios por tres convoyes. Dos grupos como decoy se hicieron humo, temiendo una emboscada en la ruta, pero los norteamericanos sabían que tenían que atacar el tercer grupo.
Ambos hombres han dirigido campañas de la milicia de Hezbolá por más de 35 años. Fueron innovadores y grandes improvisadores y tenían buen ojo para detectar las debilidades del enemigo. Ambos tenían carisma y una originalidad que sus sucesores carecen. Si bien ambos tenían una educación formal limitada, Qassem Soleimani habla árabe casi sin errores, y al- Muhadis era bilingüe al tener padre iraquí y madre iraní.
El mayor desafío para Irán, táctico, estratégico y tal vez existencial viene de otro lado. De Donald Trump, el genio de la anti-estrategia. Amigos y enemigos por igual están sorprendidos, asombrados y tal vez asustados, por sus métodos de análisis y decisorios - o la falta de ellos. De acuerdo aun informe del Secretario de Defensa Marke Esper sobre las opciones en Iraq luego del ataque a la Embajada de EEUU en Bagdad, la escena tornó de comedia a farsa negra. En una presentación con slides, la opción de matar a Soleimani fue presentada como una idea fuera de rango, sugiriendo que esa era la peor resolución, que todas las otras opciones eran mejores.
El presidente eligió ésa.
Los oficiales de inteligencia admitieron su franca sorpresa. Casi se podían escuchar el movimiento de hombros a través del Atlántico. Era como si los protocolos de planeamiento operacional y de ejecución no existieran. Se convirtieron en nada los pasos para generar un plan de misión, la evaluación de aliados y de fuerzas enemigas, y las subsecuentas gradaciones de las consecuencias segundas y terceras de los actos.
Un día después el jefe del staff del secretario de Defensa, Eric Chewning, dijo que renunciaba y que volvía a la vida civil a fin de mes.
"Los iraníes están en pánico. No saben qué viene luego, y qué es lo que Trump hará después", dijo una fuente de negocios iraquí. "No se han cruzado con algo igual antes. Irán tira abajo un dron de EEUU - un Global Hawk, del tamaño de un Boeing 737 -, aborda barcos en el Golfo, ataca terminales saudíes en el desierto, y Trump no hace nada.
"Luego están los cohetes esta semana, el ataque a la Embajada, que no fue tan peligrosa como aparecían a simple vista. Y, de inmediato él actúa, y hace esto, un verdadero golpe, que muchos ven como una sobrerreacción. Como dijimos, ha dado un fuerte golpe a los iraníes. Están asustados".
Far from it: both sides, Washington and Tehran are waiting for the next move in a strange game of chess in which they seem to be forgotten the conventions and rules of play.
A major factor is Trump’s unpredictability – it seems to scare both the Iranian and Iraqi governments, not to mention quite a number of officials in and around Washington DC.
Both principal victims of the US drone attack at Baghdad airport last week were major players, and will prove very hard to replace. Both were not without controversy as commanders, subversives, and innovators in urban guerrilla warfare. The masses that turned out for the procession of funeral ceremonies of Qasem Soleimani concealed the controversy of his career and position – among foes, allies and even the regime he served.
Both were innovators – and both, had they lived, would have been architects of their country and community’s counter strike in the new phase of confrontation with America.
They were partners at the inception of Lebanese Hezbollah – the model of many Shiite militias across Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, which they commanded for more than 20 years. Hezbollah, led by Imad Mugniyeh and sponsored by Iran, pioneered suicide car and truck bombs. In October 1983 these were used to blow up a US Marine base in Beirut, killing 241 American military personnel and 59 French paratroopers at their base.
Just two months later, at the beginning of December 1983, an underground cell of the Shiite Dawa movement set off bombs at the French and American embassies, the airport and several commercial sites in Kuwait. The plot was masterminded by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed last week alongside Qasem Soleimani. Muhandis fled to Iran, where he married, and in his absence from Kuwait was sentenced to death.
Just two months later, at the beginning of December 1983, an underground cell of the Shiite Dawa movement set off bombs at the French and American embassies, the airport and several commercial sites in Kuwait. The plot was masterminded by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed last week alongside Qasem Soleimani. Muhandis fled to Iran, where he married, and in his absence from Kuwait was sentenced to death.
In exile in Iran he would continue to plot against the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and its allies. After Qasem Soleimani took command of the al Quds commando of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps in 1998, they became allies.
It is alleged by Israeli and US sources that Soleimani was at a crucial meeting in Damascus with the Hezbollah founder-commander Imad Mugniyeh in early 2008, when the latter was assassinated by a joint CIA – Israeli Mossad operation. The details are extremely confused – not least because the streams of US and Israeli information give two different dates for the killing, either 30th January or 12th February. But the Israelis allege that their operation, directed over a radio link by their head of the armed forces, General Ashkenazy, and prime minister Ehud Olmert, wanted to hit Soleimani as well as Mugniyeh. At the last moment President George W Bush said no, and the commando waited for the Iranian to leave by car, before detonating the bomb.
The American-led incursion into Iraq of 2003 gave Soleimani and the Quds force the big opportunity in establishing the power of the Shia factions and militias following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. They retooled guerrilla tactics, especially with the introduction of shaped rounds in homemade mortars and the new form of booby trap roadside bomb, as deadly as it is cheap, known in Nato-speak as an Improvised Explosive Device, or IED. They were exported across the Middle East and adapted with great cunning by the Afghan Taliban. British soldiers felt the brunt of IEDs in Afghanistan and in Basra, which came to be an informal Quds force satrapy.
It is alleged by Israeli and US sources that Soleimani was at a crucial meeting in Damascus with the Hezbollah founder-commander Imad Mugniyeh in early 2008, when the latter was assassinated by a joint CIA – Israeli Mossad operation. The details are extremely confused – not least because the streams of US and Israeli information give two different dates for the killing, either 30th January or 12th February. But the Israelis allege that their operation, directed over a radio link by their head of the armed forces, General Ashkenazy, and prime minister Ehud Olmert, wanted to hit Soleimani as well as Mugniyeh. At the last moment President George W Bush said no, and the commando waited for the Iranian to leave by car, before detonating the bomb.
The American-led incursion into Iraq of 2003 gave Soleimani and the Quds force the big opportunity in establishing the power of the Shia factions and militias following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. They retooled guerrilla tactics, especially with the introduction of shaped rounds in homemade mortars and the new form of booby trap roadside bomb, as deadly as it is cheap, known in Nato-speak as an Improvised Explosive Device, or IED. They were exported across the Middle East and adapted with great cunning by the Afghan Taliban. British soldiers felt the brunt of IEDs in Afghanistan and in Basra, which came to be an informal Quds force satrapy.
Along with the Americans and British, the Israelis have been prime Quds and Hezbollah targets. The multi-sided war in Syria gave Soleimani fresh opportunity, with his forces shipping new precision guided missiles and rockets to his affiliates in the Syrian militias as well as Lebanese Hezbollah. Now most strategic targets, Tel Aviv airport and the large coastal power plants included, are thought to be within range of Hezbollah rocketry.
This has accelerated a growing row with leading politicians in Iran and among some parts of the military command. Since 2011, and the disruptions of the Arab Spring, Soleimani began to move from shadowy guerrilla magician, to globe strutting military statesman, not without a touch of megalomania according to critics.
This has accelerated a growing row with leading politicians in Iran and among some parts of the military command. Since 2011, and the disruptions of the Arab Spring, Soleimani began to move from shadowy guerrilla magician, to globe strutting military statesman, not without a touch of megalomania according to critics.
One of his critics was Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani. The commander and the president began having open, quite public, disagreements. Rouhani thought the rock star guerrilla was demanding too much money for his force, which is only a small part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Soleimani publicly opposed Iran’s international agreement on nuclear development, the JCPOA of 2015, which Rouhani promoted. Reluctantly the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei had to side with the politician, and not the soldier.
Rouhani was critical of what he saw as the failures of the general, especially in the backing of the Houthi in Yemen, and the cavalier disposal of Iranian allied forces in Syria. On one occasion Soleimani sent 4,000 Iranian-backed militia to fight in the Idlib pocket, without consulting superiors in Iran’s forces. More public was the row about the forward basing of new Iranian rockets and missiles in bases in Syria. From one base, T4 at Tiyas, an attack drone was launched into northern Israel. The Israelis responded by bombing T4 twice in the spring of 2018 and hitting a roster of other bases used by Iranian-sponsored forces. Rouhani suggested that the lives of Iranian had been risked needlessly.
A further complication, which also affected the umbrella command of Popular Mobilisation Forces – the Shiite militias – under Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, is the growing expense of the Hezbollah groups. Under Soleimani’s guidance, Lebanese Hezbollah became a fully-fledged fighting army, something far more than a militia group, in the war in Syria. The cost has been huge in terms of casualties – of a force of around 10 to 15,000 at least 2,500 have been killed and more than that wounded, many damaged for life. Part of the deal to get the Hezbollah fighters into Syria was that Iran would pay senior commanders’ salaries, fund restocking of weaponry, and pay pensions and compensation for war widows. There was to be a similar financial understanding for the Iraqi PMF militias once on operations.
He has now generated a crisis for both Iran and Iraq, especially the government of acting prime minister Adel Abdul al-Mahdi, a former protégé, but now increasingly a critic, of Tehran. Iran, strapped by US-led sanctions, no longer can access the necessary currency. The money for the militias has to be laundered through the corrupt back channels and byways of the Iraqi regime and its affiliates, which they can ill afford.
Iran is cut off from the dollar market. It sells about 225,000 barrels of crude per day on a long term contract with China. Apart from that, trade really is the scrapings of the barrel. The heavy fuel oil at the bottom of the reservoirs is smuggled into Iraq where it can be marketed easily because it does not bear the specific signature of finer crudes from known oilfields.
Both Muhandis and Soleimani had their enemies from within as well as without. This has generated extraordinary conspiracy theories across the region – that they may have been betrayed by one of their own. According to one report, when the plane carrying the two generals arrived at Baghdad airport, they were met by three convoys. Two groups of decoy cars set off – fearing a land ambush en route, but the Americans knew to hit the third group. Airport staff at Baghdad and in Syria have been rounded up.
Both men had directed the Hezbollah militia campaigns for over 35 years. They were innovators and improvisers and had a deadly eye for their enemies’ weaknesses. Both had charisma and an originality that their chosen deputies lack. Though of limited formal education, Qassem Soleimani spoke Arabic almost without flaw; and al-Muhandis was the bilingual son of an Iraqi father and Iranian mother.
He has now generated a crisis for both Iran and Iraq, especially the government of acting prime minister Adel Abdul al-Mahdi, a former protégé, but now increasingly a critic, of Tehran. Iran, strapped by US-led sanctions, no longer can access the necessary currency. The money for the militias has to be laundered through the corrupt back channels and byways of the Iraqi regime and its affiliates, which they can ill afford.
Iran is cut off from the dollar market. It sells about 225,000 barrels of crude per day on a long term contract with China. Apart from that, trade really is the scrapings of the barrel. The heavy fuel oil at the bottom of the reservoirs is smuggled into Iraq where it can be marketed easily because it does not bear the specific signature of finer crudes from known oilfields.
Both Muhandis and Soleimani had their enemies from within as well as without. This has generated extraordinary conspiracy theories across the region – that they may have been betrayed by one of their own. According to one report, when the plane carrying the two generals arrived at Baghdad airport, they were met by three convoys. Two groups of decoy cars set off – fearing a land ambush en route, but the Americans knew to hit the third group. Airport staff at Baghdad and in Syria have been rounded up.
Both men had directed the Hezbollah militia campaigns for over 35 years. They were innovators and improvisers and had a deadly eye for their enemies’ weaknesses. Both had charisma and an originality that their chosen deputies lack. Though of limited formal education, Qassem Soleimani spoke Arabic almost without flaw; and al-Muhandis was the bilingual son of an Iraqi father and Iranian mother.
The biggest challenge for Iran, tactical, strategic and maybe existential, comes from elsewhere. It is Donald J Trump, the genius of anti-strategy. Friends and foes alike are bewildered, astonished, fearful even, at his methods of analysis and decision – or lack of them. According to one report of the briefing at Mar-a-Lago by Defence Secretary Mark Esper about the Iraq options after the attack on the Baghdad embassy, the scene shifted from comedy to black farce. In a slide presentation, the option of taking out Soleimani was mentioned as an afterthought, suggesting this was the very worst resolution, so all the other proposals would be better.
The president went for it.
Intelligence officers have admitted frank astonishment. You could almost hear the shoulders shrugging from across the Atlantic. It was if the protocols of operational planning and execution didn’t exist. For naught were the steps of generating a mission statement, assessing allied and opposing forces, and the subsequent gradations of second and third line strategic consequences.
The president went for it.
Intelligence officers have admitted frank astonishment. You could almost hear the shoulders shrugging from across the Atlantic. It was if the protocols of operational planning and execution didn’t exist. For naught were the steps of generating a mission statement, assessing allied and opposing forces, and the subsequent gradations of second and third line strategic consequences.
A day later the chief of staff to the defence secretary, Eric Chewning, said he was quitting and would be gone back to civvy street by the end of the month.
“The Iranians are in a panic. They don’t know what’s coming next, and what Trump will do next,” a well-placed Iraqi business source said this week. “They haven’t come across anything like it before. Iran downs a big US drone – a Global Hawk, the size of a Boeing 737 –, seizes ships in the Gulf, attacks Saudi oil terminals in the desert, and Trump does nothing.
“Then we have the rockets this week, and the protests at the embassy in Baghdad, which weren’t as bad as they first appeared. And suddenly he acts, and does this, a really big hit, which many see as an over-reaction. As we say, he’s thrown a big loop for the Iranians. They’re scared.”
“The Iranians are in a panic. They don’t know what’s coming next, and what Trump will do next,” a well-placed Iraqi business source said this week. “They haven’t come across anything like it before. Iran downs a big US drone – a Global Hawk, the size of a Boeing 737 –, seizes ships in the Gulf, attacks Saudi oil terminals in the desert, and Trump does nothing.
“Then we have the rockets this week, and the protests at the embassy in Baghdad, which weren’t as bad as they first appeared. And suddenly he acts, and does this, a really big hit, which many see as an over-reaction. As we say, he’s thrown a big loop for the Iranians. They’re scared.”
